decalcomanie

quotes from this is not a pipe by michel foucault

"what is essential is that verbal signs and visual representations are never given at once. an order always hierarchizes them, running from the figure to discourse or from discourse to the figure.

this is the principle whose sovereignty klee abolished, by showing the juxtaposition of shapes and the syntax of lines in an uncertain, reversible, floating space (simultaneously page and canvas, plane and volume, map and chronicle). boats, houses, persons are at the same time recognizable figures and elements of writing. they are placed and travel upon roads or canals that are also lines to be read. trees of the forest file over musical staves. the gaze encounters words indicating the way to go and naming the landscape being crossed. and at the nexus of these figures and signs, the arrow that crops up so often (the arrow, sign bearing a primal resemblance, like a graphic onomatopoeia, and shape that formulates an order) - the arrow indicates the direction in which the boat is traveling, shows that the sun is setting, prescribes the direction that the gaze must follow, or rather the line along which it must imaginatively shift the figure provisionally and a bit arbitrarily placed here. it is not, in fact, a question of those calligrams that by turns bring into play the subordination of sign to form (a cloud of words and letters taking the shape they designate), then of form to sign (the figure dissecting itself into alphabetical elements). nor is it any longer a question of those collages or reproductions that capture the cut out form of letters in fragments of objects; but rather a question of the intersection, within the same medium, of representation by resemblance and of representation by signs. which presupposes that they meet in quite another space than that of the painting.

paul klee, the wild man

the second principle that long ruled painting posits an equivalence between the fact of resemblance and the affirmation of a representative bond. let a figure resemble an object (or some other figure), and that alone is enough for there to slip into the pure play of the painting a statement - obvious, banal, repeated a thousand times yet almost always silent. (it is like an infinite murmur - haunting, enclosing the silence of figures, investing it, mastering it, extricating the silence from itself, and finally reversing it within the domain of things that can be named.) 'what you see is that.' no matter, again, in what sense the representative relation is posed - whether the painting is referred to the visible world around it, or whether it independently establishes an individual world that resembles itself. the essential point is that resemblance and affirmation cannot be dissociated."

"resemblance presupposes a primary reference that prescribes and classes. the similar develops in series that have neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as easily as in another, that obey no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small differences among small differences. resemblance serves representation, which rules over it; similitude serves repetition, which ranges across it. resemblance predicates itself upon a model it must return to and reveal; similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar."

rene magritte, decalcomanie

"in decalcomanie (1966): occupying two thirds of the painting, a red curtain with large pleats obscures a landscape of sky, sea, and sand. beside the curtain, turning his back as usual to the viewer, the man with the bowler hat looks out to sea.

now, we find that the curtain has been cut out in exactly the shape of the man: as if he himself (although of another color, texture, and width) were merely a section of curtain snipped away by scissors. within the large opening the beach is visible. what are we to make of this? is it that the man, in changing places, having departed the curtain, exposes what he was looking at when he was still enfolded within it? or is it that the painter, in moving the man a few centimeters, has set against the curtain that fragment of sky, water, and sand that the man's silhouette hid from the viewer - so that thanks to the cooperation of the artist, we can see what is contemplated by the silhouette that blocks our view? or must we admit that at the moment the man turns to look at it, the fragment of landscape immediately before him has leapt aside, avoiding his gaze so that before his eyes it became his shadow, the black smudge of his body? transference? doubtless. but from what to what? from where to where? the thick black silhouette of the man seems to have been shifted from right to left, from the curtain onto the landscape he now obscures; the fold he makes in the curtain displays his prior position. but in the shape of a man's silhouette, the landscape has also been cut loose and transferred from left to right. the scrap of red curtain that remains bizarrely attached to the shoulder of this human landscape, and that corresponds to the small part of curtain hidden by the black silhouette, in itself demonstrates the origin and the location from which the sky and water were cut. a displacement and exchange of similar elements, but by no means mimetic reproduction.

and thanks to decalcomanie the advantage of similitude over resemblance can be grasped. the latter reveals the clearly visible; similitude reveals what recognizable objects, familiar silhouettes hide, prevent from being seen, render invisible ('body' = 'curtain,' says mimetic representation. 'right is left, left is right; the hidden here is visible there; the sunken is in relief; flatness extends into depth,' says the similitudes of decalcomanie.) resemblance makes a unique assertion, always the same: this thing, that thing, yet another thing is something else. similitude multiplies different affirmations, which dance together, tilting and tumbling over one another."

[Footnote: 'decalcomania.' the title embodies a complex play of ideas. decalcomanie means transference, transferency, or decal; it is also a painterly technique (often mentioned by breton) in which pigment is transferred from one side of a painted surface to another by folding over the canvas. finally, decalcomanie refers to a species of madness bound up with the idea of shifting identities.]

the body of the condemned

all quotes from discipline and punish by michel foucault

"undercover of the relative stability of the law, a mass of subtle and rapid changes has occurred. certainly the 'crimes' and 'offences' on which judgment is passed are juridical objects defined by the code, but judgment is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, through them, is aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; murders, but also drives and desires. but, it will be objected, judgment is not actually being passed on them; if they are referred to at all it is to explain the actions in question, and to determine to what extent the subject's will was involved in the crime. this is no answer. for it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished."

"knowledge of the offence, knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law: these three conditions made it possible to ground a judgment in truth. but now a quite different question of truth is inscribed in the course of the penal judgment. the question is no longer simply: 'has the act been established and is it punishable?' but also: 'what is this act, what is this act of violence or this murder? to what level or to what field of reality does it belong? is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action?' it is no longer simply: 'who committed it?' but: 'how can we assign the causal process that produced it? where did it originate in the author himself? instinct, unconscious, environment, heredity?' it is not longer simply: 'what law punishes this offence?' but: 'what would be the most appropriate measures to take? how do we see the future development of the offender? what would be the best way of rehabilitating him?' a whole set of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments concerning the criminal have become lodged in the framework of penal judgment."

"the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. this political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as a labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. this subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violence; it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order. that is to say, there may be a 'knowledge' of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of the body. of course, this technology is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse"

aphrodisia

quotes from the use of pleasure: the history of sexuality by michel foucault

"the aphrodisia are the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure."

"when aristotle in his nicomachean ethics wants to determine exactly which people deserve to be called 'self-indulgent,' his definition is cautiously restrictive: self-indulgence - akolasia - relates only to the pleasures of the body, and among these, the pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell must be excluded.  it is not self-indulgent to 'delight in' colors, shapes, or paintings, nor in theater or music; one can, without self-indulgence, delight in the scent of fruit, roses, or incense; and. . . anyone who would become so intensely absorbed in looking at a statue or in listening to a song as to lose his appetite or taste for lovemaking could not be reproached for self-indulgence"

"for there is pleasure that is liable to akolasia only where there is touch and contact: contact with the mouth, the tongue, and the throat (for the pleasures of food and drink), or contact with other parts of the body (for the pleasures of sex)."

"one should, however, note the importance attributed by many greek texts to the gaze and to the eyes in the genesis of desire or love, but it is not that the pleasure of the gaze is self-indulgent; rather, it is thought to make an opening through which the soul is reached. . . as for the kiss, it was very highly valued as a physical pleasure and a communication of souls despite the danger it carried.  as a matter of fact, an entire historical study could be undertaken on the 'pleasure body' and its transformations."

"in the teaching and the exercise of moderation, it is recommended to be wary of sounds, images, and scents; but this is not because attachment to them would be only the masked form of a desire whose essence is sexual: it is because there are musical forms capable of weakening the soul with their rhythms, and because there are sights capable of affecting the soul like a venom, and because a particular scent, a particular image, is apt to call up the 'memory of the thing desired.'"

"in the experience of the aphrodisia. . . act, desire, and pleasure formed an ensemble whose elements were distinguishable certainly, but closely bound to one another."

"nature intended. . . that the performance of the act be associated with a pleasure, and it was this pleasure that gave rise to epithumia, to desire, in a movement that was naturally directed toward what 'gives pleasure', according to a principle that aristotle cites: desire is always 'desire for the agreeable thing'. . .for the greeks there could not be desire without privation, without the want of the thing desired and without a certain amount of suffering mixed in; but the appetite, plato explains in the philebus, can be aroused only by the representation, the image or the memory of the thing that gives pleasure."  


"what seems in fact to have formed the object of moral reflection for the greeks in matters of sexual conduct was not exactly the act itself (considered in its different modalities), or desire (viewed from the standpoint of its origin or its aim), or even pleasure (evaluated according to the different objects or practices that can cause it); it was more the dynamics that joined all three in a circular fashion (the desire that leads to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire).  the ethical question that was raised was not: which desires?  which acts?  which pleasures?  but rather with what force is one transported 'by the pleasures and desires'?  . . .it was an ontology of a force that linked together acts, pleasures, and desires.  it was this dynamic relationship that constituted what might be called the texture of the ethical experience of the aphrodisia." 

"the second major variable that engaged moral valuation, in addition to the 'quantity of activity' criterion, was the question of remaining in one's role or abandoning it, being the subject of the activity or its object, joining those who underwent it - even if one was a man - or remaining with those who actively performed it.  for a man, excess and passivity were the two main forms of immorality in the practice of the aphrodisia."

"while it was all right to 'use' pleasures, one had to be careful not to be carried away by them - the reason was not that sexual activity was a vice, nor that it might deviate from a canonical model; it was because sexual activity was associated with a force, an energeia, that was itself liable to be excessive."

"when he speaks in the symposium, the doctor eryximachus claims for his art the prerogrative of advising on the  manner in which one must make use of the pleasures of the bed and the table; according to him, it is doctors who ought to say how to enjoy rich food without making oneself sick; it also rests with them to prescribe, to those who practice physical love - eros pandemos - how to have an orgasm without any resulting ill effects.  it would be interesting, surely, to trace the long history of the connections between alimentary ethics and sexual ethics, as manifested in doctrines, but also in religious rituals and dietary rules; one would need to discover how, over a long period of time, the play of alimentary prescriptions became uncoupled from that of sexual morals, by following the evolution of their respective importance (with the rather belated moment, no doubt, when the problem of sexual conduct became more worrisome that that of alimentary behaviors) and the gradual differentiation of their specific structure (the moment when sexual desire began to be questioned in terms other than alimentary appetite)."

"they all raised the same question: how could one, how must one 'make use' of this dynamics of pleasures, desires, and acts?  a question of right use."

the use of pleasure

quotes from the use of pleasure: the history of sexuality volume two by michel foucault

"what were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals?"

"as for what motivated me. . . it was curiosity - the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself.  after all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of herself?"

"it is easy to see that each of these great figures of sexual austerity is tied to an axis of experience and to a cluster of concrete relationships: relations to the body, with the question of health, and behind it the whole game of life and death; the relation to the other sex, with the question of the spouse as privileged partner, in the the game of the family institution and the ties it creates; the relation to one's own sex, with the question of partners that one can choose within it, and the problem of the adjustment between social roles and sexual roles; and finally, the relation to truth, where the question is raised of the spiritual conditions that enable one to gain access to wisdom."

"given a code of actions, and with regard to a specific type of actions (which can be defined by their degree of conformity with or divergence from the code), there are different ways to 'conduct oneself' morally, different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of this action.  take, for example, a code of sexual prescriptions enjoining the two marital partners to practice a strict and symmetrical conjugal fidelity, always with a view to procreation; there will be many ways, even within such a rigid frame, to practice that austerity, many ways to 'be faithful'.  these differences can bear on several points worth considering."

"they concern what might be called the determination of the ethical substance; that is, the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct.  thus, one can relate the crucial aspects of the practice of fidelity to the strict observance of interdictions and obligations in the very acts one accomplishes.  but one can also make the essence of fidelity consist in the mastery of desires, in the fervent combat one directs against them, in the strength with which one is able to resist temptations: what makes up the content of fidelity in this case is that vigilance and that struggle.  in these conditions, the contradictory movements of the soul - much more than the carrying out of the acts themselves - will be the prime material of moral practice.  alternatively, one can have it consist in the intensity, continuity, and reciprocity of feelings that are experienced vis-a-vis the partner, and in the quality of the relationship that permanently binds the two spouses."

"the differences can also have to do with the mode of subjection: that is, with the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice. . . one can also practice fidelity in response to an appeal, by offering oneself as an example, or by seeking to give one's personal life a form that answers to criteria of brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection."

"there are also possible differences in the forms of elaboration, of ethical work that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behavior.  thus, sexual austerity can be practiced through a long effort of learning, memorization, and assimilation of a systematic ensemble of precepts, and through a regular checking of conduct aimed at measuring the exactness with which one is applying these rules.  it can be practiced in the form of a sudden, all-embracing, and definitive renunciation of pleasures; it can also be practiced in the form of a relentless combat whose vicissitudes - including momentary setbacks - can have meaning and value in themselves; and it can be practiced through a decipherment as painstaking, continuous, and detailed as possible, of the movements of desire in all its hidden forms, including the most obscure."

"other differences, finally, concern what might be called the telos of the ethical subject: an action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also moral in its circumstantial integration and by virtue of the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct.  it is an element and an aspect of this conduct, and it marks a stage in its life, a possible advance in its continuity.  a moral action tends toward its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the establishing of a moral conduct that commits an individual, not only to other actions always in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject."

"all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self.  the latter is not simply 'self-awareness' but self-formation as an 'ethical subject', a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal.  and this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform herself.  there is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without 'modes of subjectivation' and an 'ascetics' or 'practices of the self' that support them."

"moral conceptions in greek and greco-roman antiquity were much more oriented toward practices of the self and the question of askesis than toward codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden. . . the accent was placed on the relationship with the self that enabled a person to keep from being carried away by the appetites and pleasures, to maintain a mastery and superiority over them, to keep his senses in a state of tranquility, to remain free from interior bondage to the passions, and to achieve a mode of being that could be defined by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself."